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Abstract 
Emerging cloud applications are growing rapidly and the need for identifying and managing service requirements 
is also highly important and critical at present. Software Engineering and Information Systems has established 
techniques, methods and technology over two decades to help achieve cloud service requirements, design, devel-
opment, and testing. However, due to the lack of understanding of software security vulnerabilities that should 
have been identified and managed during the requirements engineering phase, we have not been so successful in 
applying software engineering, information management, and requirements management principles that have been 
established for the past at least 25 years, when developing secure software systems. Therefore, software security 
cannot just be added after a system has been built and delivered to customers as seen in today’s software applica-
tions. This paper provides concise methods, techniques, and best practice requirements management guidelines 
for software security and also discusses an Integrated-Secure SDLC model (IS-SDLC), which will benefit practi-
tioners, researchers, learners, and educators. This paper illustrates our approach for a large cloud system Amazon 
EC2 service. 
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1 Introduction 
There is no doubt that the cloud computing has revolutionised human lives, communications, digital 
economy, socialisation, and entertainment. At the same time demands for internet enabled applications 
grows rapidly. Almost all businesses, applications, entertainment devices, mobile devices, robots, large 
scale systems (aircrafts, mission control systems), safety-critical systems, medical systems, internet of 
things devices are internet enabled for various reasons such as online upgrade, distributed applications, 
team projects, and server connectivity. Therefore, there is ever growing demand for secured applications 
and trust. Cyber attacks are increasing continuously From spam, phishing, identify theft, and others in 
much larger scale attacks such as money laundering and cyber terrorism. There is a real possibility that 
a cyber attack could disable command systems, bring down power grids, open dam floodgates, paralyses 
communications and transport systems, creating mass hysteria: Any or all of which could be the pre-
cursor to terrorist or military attack. These are some of the threats since we (personal, govt. organisa-
tions, companies, and business) mostly depend on computers and mobiles for communications and 
management. 
Emerging cloud services are on the increase including eHealth Cloud, E-Learning, E-Manufac-
turing, etc. Kostoska, M, Gusev, M, and Ristov, S (2014) describe a new cloud protability platform 
(PaaS) as a service which can accept and exchange from one cloud platform to another platform and 
installed completely automatically. Han, G et al (2016) have proposed an energy-aware VM consolida-
tion based on remaining utilisation-aware algorithm (RUA). Xu (2013) has proposed an interoperable 
cloud manufacturing system (ICMS) which shares encapsulated resources into a cloud service for man-
ufacturing where manufacturing capabilities and business opportunities are integrated and broadcasted 
in a larger resource pool.  Shrivastava et al. (2015) describes how eHealth initiatives and the technology 
helps to achieve health services at a very low cost by connecting and consulting expertise worldwide 
for very complicated surgeries, use cloud services, IoT services for collecting and monitoring data, and 
they also recommend to integrate various technologies.  
The cloud vendors include well known businesses such as Amazon EC2, IBM, HP. Google, 
Microsoft Azure. In addition, there are new cloud businesses on the market such as 2nd Watch which 
has partnered with AWS (Amazon EC2 Web Service)  offers cloud migration, workload management, 
and has has 75,000 instances from hundreds of customers under its management. Similarly, BetterCloud 
automated management and data security for cloud office platforms, including Google Apps and Mi-
crosoft Office 365 (Whiting 2015) Hsu and Cheng (2015) describe a Semantic Agent as a Service 
(SAaaS) which collects and discover knowledge from semantic information and works with core cloud 
services: SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS. All of the cloud vendors agree the strong need for secure cloud services 
and business migration. 
This paper aims to outline the importance of developing secure cloud services using a disci-
plined approach known as software security engineering and it is also known as secure software devel-
opment. In particular, this paper identifies key methods and techniques on software security require-
ments engineering as it is the heart of developing secure cloud services. This paper discusses clear best 
practice guidelines on software security and discusses our Integrated-Secure SDLC (IS-SDLC) model 
which overcomes current difficulties in identifying and visually representing security process which 
have been elaborated From security requirements. In addition, we all enjoy the new technologies based 
on service computing, such as mobile apps, cloud storages, social media networks, and cloud services 
such as Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service 
(IaaS). The need for high performance cloud computing and accuracy and precision of big data enforce 
the need for complete identification of non-functions cloud service requirements and its specification. 
In addition, security, privacy & trust are the key to the success of cloud computing, which needs to be 
identified and specified as part of the requirements management process. This paper divided into: sec-
tion 1 discusses on introduction to our work, section 2 provides the rationale for the subject area, section 
3 introduces software security requirements engineering and management, and section 4 introduces an 
integrated approach to SDLC, and the final section provides a large scale case study using Microsoft 
Security Development Lifecycle on threat modelling techniques for Amazon EC2 cloud services. 
2 Why Software Security Engineering? 
Software Engineering has established techniques, methods, and technology over two decades. However, security 
issues are direct attributes of various software such as applications, user interface, networking, distribution, data-
intensive transactions, and communication tools, etc. Current applications are being developed and delivered 
where security has been patched as aftermath. Early commercial developers have tackled security problems using 
firewalls (at the application level), penetration testing, and patch management. 
We are also faced with tackling fast growing information warfare, cybercrime, cyber-terrorism, identify theft, 
spam, and other various threats. Therefore, it is important to understand the security concerns starting From re-
quirements, design, and testing to help us Build-In Security (BSI) instead of batching security afterwards. McGraw 
(2006) says a central and critical aspect of the computer security problem is a software problem. This paper 
defines software security engineering as a discipline which considers capturing and modelling for security, design 
for security, adopting best practices, testing for security, managing, and educating software security to all stake-
holders.  
Software engineering has well established framework of methods, techniques, rich processes that can address 
small to very large scale products and organisations (CMM, CMMi, SPICE, etc.), and the associated technology 
such as modelling (UML), CASE tools, and CAST tools, and others. Software Engineering has also been well 
established quality models and methods, reuse models and methods, reliability models and methods, and numer-
ous lists of other techniques. The so called -lities of software engineering long has been contributed as part of 
quality attributes (Quality, Testability, Maintainability, Security, Reliability, Reusability). These attributes can’t 
be just added on to the system as they have to be built in From early part of the life cycle stages (a typical software 
development lifecycle include starting From requirements engineering (RE), software specification, software & 
architectural design, software development (coding), software testing, and maintenance. Security has become 
highly important attribute since the development of online based applications. Software project management has 
well established techniques and breadth of knowledge including global development (due to emergence of internet 
revolution and people skills across the globe), cost reduction techniques, risk management techniques, and others. 
Nowadays, most of the current systems and devices are web enabled and hence security needs to be achieved right 
From beginning: need to be identified, captured, designed, developed and tested. Ashford (2009) reports UK 
business spends 75% of the software development budget on fixing security flaws after delivering the product. 
This is a huge expenditure and it also creates untrustworthiness amongst customers. Figure 1 shows the chart for 
the annual spending on IT security which demonstrated the increase of more than 10% each year (Gartner 2016). 
 
 
Figure 1 Annual Spending on Information Security 
In addition, recent issues with cloud security strategies, techniques are elaborated by Chang and Ramachandran 
(2015;2016). 
 
Allen et al. (2008) state that the one of the main goals of Software Security Engineering is to address software 
security best practices, process, techniques, and tools in every phases and activities of any standard software 
development life cycle (SDLC). The main goal of building secured software which is defect FSRee and better 
built with: 
 Continue to operate normally in any event of attacks and to tolerate any failure 
 Limiting damages emerging as an outcome of any attacks triggered 
 Build Trust & Resiliency In (BTRI) 
 Data and asset protection  
In other words, secured software should operate normally in the event of any attacks. In addition, it involves 
the process of extracting security requirements from overall system requirements (includes hardware, software, 
business, marketing, and environmental requirements) and then also further refined and extracted security and 
software security requirements from software and business requirements. Then the refined software security re-
quirements can be embedded and traced across the software development life cycle (SDLC) phases such as re-
quirements, design, development, and testing. This has not explained well in security related literatures so far. 
This provides a clear definition of eliciting software security requirements. 
 
Examples of recent cyber attacks include attacks on Carphone warehouse which resulted in the loss of personal 
details of up to 2.4 million Carphone Warehouse customers may have been accessed in a cyber-attack, the mobile 
phone retailer says. Similar news has been too FSRequent in recent news such as Talktalk, etc. Therefore, the 
conclusion is, what we have discovered is only a handful of cyber-attacks and software vulnerabilities and what 
is left to uncover is the size of the sea. 
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3 Software Security Requirements Engineering and Management 
Requirements are the starting point, responsible for any system, legal and contractual issues, governance, and  
provide full functional perspective of the system being developed. Requirements Engineering is a discipline in its 
own right, which provides process, tools, techniques, modelling, cost estimation, project planning, and contractual 
agreements. There are wealth of requirements engineering methods, techniques, best practice guidelines, and tools 
(Jacobson 1992; Kotenya and Sommerville, 1992; Lambsweede 2009; Sawyer and Sommerville 1998). However, 
due to the nature of increased demands for security-driven applications, current techniques are inadequate for 
capturing security related requirements effectively. Firesmith (2007; 2003) reports that poor requirements are the 
main reasons for cost and schedule overruns, poor functionality and delivered systems that are never used. Re-
quirements are classified into two major parts such as functional requirements which deal with the functionality 
of the system and non-functional requirements which deal with constraints, quality, data, standards, regulations, 
interfaces, performance, reliability, and other implementation requirements. Studies (Jacobson 1992; Kotenya and 
Sommerville 1992; Lambsweede 2009; Sawyer and sommerville 1998) have shown that requirements engineering 
defects cost 10 to 200 times to correct the system after implementation. Therefore, it is paramount to get the 
requirements correct, concise, and unambiguous. 
 
Capturing business security requirements is a collaborative effort involves many stakeholders such as business 
analysts, software requirements engineer, software architect, and test managers. Security requirements should 
provide a clear set of security specific needs and expected behavior of a system. The main aim is to protect systems 
assets (data and files) and unauthorised access to the system from intentional attacks to the application software 
systems and other forms of internet based security attacks such as spam, denial of service, identity theft, viruses, 
and many other forms of intentional attacks that emerges every day. Security remains a software problem as the 
number of threats and vulnerabilities reported to CERT-SEI & CERT-UK (Computer Emergency Response team) 
of 2493% increase between 1997 (311 cases reported), 2006 (8064 cases reported), and as of 30th April 2015 
(3192 cases reported). 
 
In traditional RE, security requirements are considered to be a part of non-function properties and are consid-
ered an aspect of implementation strategies such as password protection, authentication, firewalls, virus detection, 
denial-of-service attacks, etc. Therefore, security needs to be considered as highly specific set of requirements for 
every functional requirements that has been identified, and has to be applied throughout the life cycle so that we 
can achieve build in security (BSI). In addition, current RE methods have considered mostly what the system must 
do, but what the system must not do. This is the key issue that will be considered when selecting RE methods for 
software security. Moreover, in Software security RE methods, there are more stakeholders than traditional RE 
methods have considered such as social engineers, security specialist, business process modeling experts, service 
computing specialists, and users. Often attackers look for defects in the system, not the system features and func-
tionalities.  
 
This section will look at the various methodologies for eliciting requirements for software security. Most com-
mon best practices are: 
 
1. Eliciting and extracting requirements for software security explicitly 
2. Prioritising security requirements 
3. Risk assessment for security requirements 
4. Design and implement security requirements 
 
Before embarking on details of various methods for eliciting security requirements, we will try and understand 
three important basic concepts: use cases, misuse cases, and abuse cases. The use case has been an effective form 
of representing user requirements (user who interacts with the system is also known as the actor) visually (Jacob-
son 1992; Kotonya and Sommerville 1998; Lamsweerde 2009). This visual form represents a user requirements 
story is also known as scenario. Therefore, a use case = scenario (user story) + actors (who interacts with the 
system). The combination of a scenario and actors is known as a use case. However, the use case has not exploited 
much for representing non-functional aspects of the systems. Hence, is the reason for the emergence of new tech-
niques such as misuse and abuse cases. Misuse case can help us to represent security requirements visually From 
the attacker’s point of view (an example might be trying to login to the system with different password combina-
tion) whereas the abuse case should represent security requirements From a much stronger destruction aspects of 
the system (an example might be trying to destroy by changing registration key, configuration and other DLL 
files). A number of techniques have emerged to address RE from an attacker’s perspective: 
 
 Attack patterns are similar to design patterns which has been designed to study attacks from destructive 
mode, Allen et al. (2008) and Build Security In (BSI). 
 Misuse and abuse cases are a set of use cases From an attacker's perspective, McGraw (2006) 
 Attack trees provide a formal mechanism for analysing and describing various ways in which attacks can 
happen From an attacker’s perspective. Simply represent attacks against a system in a tree structure, with 
the goal as the root node and different ways of achieving that goal as leaf nodes, Schneier (1999;2000) 
and Ellison and Moore (2003) 
 Microsoft SDL (SDL 2016 & TAM 2016) provides support on threat modelling which describes a set of 
security aspects by defining a set of possible security attacks. This has an integral part of Microsoft’s 
SDL method, Howard and LeBlanc (2002) 
 Building Security In (BSI) method (2013), process, design principles, and techniques provided by 
McGraw (2006) and others which is now officially supported by the US department of Homeland secu-
rity. Some of the design principles include: 
o Correctness by Construction (CbyC) 
o Securing the Weakest Link 
o Defense in Depth 
o Failing Securely 
o Least Privilege 
o Separation of Privilege 
o Economy of Mechanism 
o Least Common Mechanism 
o Reluctance to Trust 
o Never Assuming that your Secrets are Safe 
o Complete Mediation 
o Psychological Acceptability 
o Promoting Privacy 
 The SEI’s (Software Engineering Institute) has identified a method known as SQUARE (Secure Quality 
Requirements Engineering) method described by Mead et al. (2008) which is to elicit and prioritise re-
quirements and its consists of nine steps as follow: 
─ Agree on definition 
─ Identify security goals 
─ Develop artifacts 
─ Perform risk assessments 
─ Select an elicitation technique 
─ Elicit security requirements 
─ Categorise security requirements 
─ Prioritise security requirements 
─ Inspect security requirements 
─ Clear identification of requirements of the whole application system and extract security requirements. 
Interact with stakeholders to clarify security requirements and the technology they want to use, and 
cost implications. 
 OCTAVE method by Caralli at al. (2007), Alberts and Dorofee (2002) and Woody and Alberts (2007) provides 
clear activities on security requirements: 
o Identify critical assets 
o Define security goals 
o Identify threats 
o Analyze risks 
o Define security requirements  
 Other methods include CLASP (2006) and S-SDLC and have given detailed descriptions by Ramachandran 
(Ramachandran 2012). 
Chen (2004) distinguishes the key difference between software security engineering with that of robustness for 
software safety engineering. Software security engineering deals with engineering approach to software develop-
ment with an aim to engineer and implement security features whereas robustness deals with engineering software 
for safety critical systems. Therefore, we need to identify, analyse, and incorporate security requirements as part 
of the functional requirements process. Belapurkar et al. (2009) have identified a list of some high-level areas for 
each security specific functional requirements as follows: 
 
 Identification should address how a system recognises the actors/entities (humans or systems) interacting with 
the system. 
 Authentication should address how a system validates the identity of entities 
 Authorisation should address what privileges are to be set for an entity interacting with a system 
 Non-repudiation should address how a system prevents entities from repudiating their interactions with the 
system functionality 
 Integrity should address how a system protects information From any intentional or unintentional modifications 
and tampering 
 Auditing should address how a system allows auditors to see the status of the security controls in place 
 Privacy should address how a system prevents the unauthorised disclosure of sensitive information 
 Availability should address how a system protects itself From intentional disruptions to service so that it is 
available to users when they need it. 
Software security requirements are not only a set of constraints on the software systems, but they satisfy required 
governance and provides protection and trust. This means that we need far newer techniques such as attack pat-
terns, misuse and abuse cases as part any requirements process. Tasks and activities associated with requirements 
engineering management for software security are shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 Requirements Management Tasks and Activities 
As shown in Figure 2, requirements traceability management (RTM) been defined as the management of the 
requirements traceability matrix created and validated during requirements development phase. The RTM has 
been often created using a simple file or by the CASE tools. RTM links requirements artifacts across the other 
artifacts such as design, code, test case for a complete RTM. The issue is that existing traditional approaches have 
not considered software security that have been identified using current requirements, methods discussed in this 
section (misuse cases, threat modelling, etc.). Therefore the Figure 2 highlights the importance of integrating 
software security artifacts with the traditional RTM system. According our RTM method proposed consists of 
five tasks as part of the software security RE phase:  
 Elicit functional service requirements (FSR) and the activities are analyse FSR, Create Functional 
model, Create Use Case Models 
 Elicit non-functional service requirements (NFSR) and the associated activities are Analyse security 
FSR, Analyse software security NFSR, Create NFSR to FSR Mapping, Create Misuse Case and Abuse 
Case Models, Develop Threat Modelling with Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) 
 Elicit Project Requirements and the associated and linked activities are Develop Requirements Project 
Documentations & Contract Documents, Create Project Scope Management, Validate requirements 
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using protoype, executable specification, business process modelling & simulation, Design and sim-
ulate Network Design for system security using OPNET/NS2 Simulation tools 
 Elicit & capture stakeholder requirements and the associated activities are Agile based such as: Iden-
tify and capture stakeholder requirements and to the list, Adopt Agile requirements Principles: Cus-
tomer First, Involving Stakeholders as part of project development, Regular meeting with Stakehold-
ers 
 Create Requirements Traceability Management (RTM) and associated activities include Create a re-
quirements management, traceability link and connect artifacts to requirements, Create mapping for 
all SDLC artifacts, Create Dependebaility Analysis, Create Correlation Graphs Amongst Traceability 
Elements 
 
This key idea is to adopt a holistic approach to requirements engineering management for software security 
which includes state of the art techniques and practices. This will allow us to create a succinct software security 
requirements that are validated with simulation technologies such as BPMN (Business Process Modelling No-
tations) that allow validation of requirements by simulating the proposed processes against expected perfor-
mance and the level of security with be builded-in (BSI). 
4 Security Vulnerability Identification and Integration for DDoS Attacks 
This section discusses on the number of vulnerabilities, also presents SDLC on threat modelling for vulnera-
bility identification during RE phase. This is demonstrated with the use of DDoS (Distributed Denial-of-Service) 
Attacks which has been common in cloud services and other critical business sectors such as Carphone warehouse, 
talktalk mobile, etc. This is mostly because of the existing browsers that have been developed with BSI. Therefore, 
adding security through patches as seen in current practices has proven to be vulnerable to cybersecurity attacks. 
This is illustrated in Figure 3 on vulnerability analysis for various existing browsers using existing available data.  
 
 
Figure 3 Known Vulnerability in Browsers 
 
Risk analysis is also an important part of any requirements and modelling process. Ashbaugh (2006) says 90% 
of the software security vulnerabilities are caused by known software defect types and hence one way to reduce 
these vulnerabilities is to conduct risk analysis for software security throughout SDLC systematically. 
In our approach, according our RTM methods, we propose the use of Microsoft Threat Modelling Tool known 
as Microsoft SDL (Security Development Lifecycle). This is shown in Figure 4 which consists of vision (software 
security requirements) leads to create threat models and allows us to consider various threats for each functional 
requirements and for each threat identified makes us to consider a number of mitigation. During this phase, a 
threat model report will be generated using the Microsoft threat modelling tool (TAM 2016). In our case study, 
we have used Amazon EC2 infrastructure and analysed for potential DDOS threat and mitigation. 
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Figure 4 Microsoft Threat Modeling Process 
 
The first step is building a clear vision by planning the location for each equipment. In this phase, it is preferred 
to produce a statement that explains the reason and the role of every asset chosen to be deployed, and this operation 
will help the organization to separate between activities. 
After having a clear vision, a data flow diagram will be modeled in order to understand the flow of data between 
internal and external assets. Generally, there are four elements, which could be used for tagging boundaries: 
1. Data flow: for tracking the flow of data from source to destination. 
2. Entry points: is every asset that receives data from externals, and it can be a user, Hardware or software. 
At this level, we should eliminate DDoS potential attacks opportunities that may be exposed. 
3. Trust Boundaries: which determines all trusted networks and domains; for example, devices such as 
routers, Firewall and load balancers. 
4. Protected assets: which defines the critical assets, which must be, protected for instance customer’s 
database or storage. 
 
Because DDoS attacks are targeting only the availability of resources; identifying threats should focus only 
on the DDoS attack taxonomies (Resource and Bandwidth depletion) and then mark the severity of each of them. 
The fourth step after threat identification is developing possible countermeasures for mitigating all identified 
threats. Different categories are available to mark all mitigation mechanisms such as; mitigated, not mitigated or 
do not require mitigation. In this stage, any proposed mechanism should be analyzed in depth by countering the 
attack from all dimensions. 
The last step of the threat modeling process is the validation of all our analysis and findings. Furthermore, by 
measuring the impact of any attack in case of a mitigation failure; for example, if a DDoS attack has successfully 
targeted the internal load balancer; what are the consequences that may impact the resources?  
As amazon AWS doesn't expose its internal architecture for security purposes.  We have decided to rely on 
some research papers and online websites to better understand the architecture, and according to Amazon AWS 
reference architectures paper; different devices are deployed within its data centers realm, such as; Firewall, DNS 
Resolution, application and web servers, redundant multi zones, Elastic Load Balancers, Intrusion Prevention 
System (IPS), Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3), Amazon CloudFront. In order to organize the simulation; 
the project will be divided into two main phases: 
The first phase is studying the behavior of Amazon EC2 architecture under DDoS attacks. In this phase two 
scenarios will be developed. The first one is generating a legitimate traffic From different resources, and then 
monitors the reaction of Amazon Instances. The second scenario will target these instances with different DDoS 
taxonomies and compare the results with our previous findings. The following Figure 5 DDoS attack tree is de-
veloped to direct our DDoS attack development. 
  
 
 
Figure 5 DDoS Attack Tree 
 
Shneier (1999; 2000) has invented a methodical approach for describing threats  against a protected, system. 
This process uses a tree structure for representing the objective as the root node, and leaf nodes will determine 
how to achieve that objective. Because of the high complexity of large scale networks; attack trees should receive 
high attention because if one idea is missed on how to compromise an asset; the attack tree will be useless. The 
above figure illustrates the various attacks that available to perpetrators for targeting Amazon AWS infrastructure 
by distributed denial of service attack using the resource or bandwidth depletion. 
Analyzing the reasons behind the occurrence of DDoS attack will enable our project to develop a comprehen-
sive mechanism that will counter broadly the current vulnerability of our systems and protocols.  
It is necessary that our research should follow a systematic approach for the purpose of developing the product, 
and all selected methods and procedures should be suitable for the product requirements, also procedures should 
have high standards in term of efficiency and accuracy. 
4.1 Identify threats 
In this phase, threats can be identified and classified based on STRIDE model that was developed by Microsoft, 
and it consists of classifying threats into six categories: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, denial of service and 
Elevation of privilege (STRIDE 2002). STRIDE approach consists of analyzing each component against potential 
threats using process decomposition, and for every threat, possible mitigations can be proposed allowing consol-
idation of robust security in cloud infrastructures. This is shown in Table 1. 
 
Threat Security Property 
Spoofing Authentication 
Tampering Integrity 
Repudiation Non-Repudiation 
Information Disclosure Confidentiality 
Denial of Service Availability 
Elevation of Privilege Authorization 
          Table 1 Threats and Security Properties                                                                                                                   
 As DDoS attacks target only the availability of resources, we will shrink our scope to only focus on a DOS 
category by identifying the assets that could be targeted as detailed below:                           
- Firewall and IPS are designed to address threats targeting network integrity and confidentiality by stor-
ing and inspecting each communication session stored on its entry table. During a DDoS; an attacker 
could exhaust their resources by filling the entry table with bogus packet information.  
- As we know, server load balancers can be employed for tolerating server failure by distributing the task 
across different data centres for achieving high application availability as well as server scalability. 
However, the effectiveness of load balancing algorithms (Round Robin, Randomized, Threshold, Cen-
tral Manager) is facing various challenges in term of throughput, response time scalability and resource 
utilization during a network flood as different research papers have evaluated static and dynamic load 
balancing algorithms performance. 
- Links deployed within the cloud infrastructure can be tightened with layer 3/4 volumetric attack, espe-
cially when the Botnet is able to generate up to 300 GB traffic that is hard to be handled with the current 
available network links. 
Ranking is part of threat identification process; any critical component that its failure could cause a serious 
bottleneck should be assigned the highest rank that later on during the mitigation process the component will 
receive more attention as well as advanced security controls. However, Microsoft DREAD threat risk ranking 
model could be employed to rank threats based on: damage potential, reproducibility, exploitability, affected users 
and discoverability. We have applied DREAD model to our cloud infrastructure scenario in order to come up 
some defense techniques against DDoS attacks, as shown in the Table 2. 
 
Threat D R E A D Total Rating 
Exhausting the resource of a 
cloud server using a flood based 
Internet Group Management 
Protocol. 
8 9 7 6 5 35 Medium risk 
Targeting a cloud server with 
DNS amplification attack (Re-
ceiving high load of recursive 
queries). 
9 9 9 9 9 45 Medium risk 
A cloud server will be targeted 
with an ICMP amplification at-
tack (Spoofing the source ad-
dress of ping request). 
4 7 8 3 4 26 Medium risk 
An end system will be crashed 
by a Land attack (Receiving 
packets with same IP source 
and destination address). 
4 7 8 3 4 26 Medium risk 
Consuming the resources of a 
system using SYN flood attack. 
4 7 8 3 4 26 Medium risk 
A SIP Proxy server could be 
targeted by a high load of SIP 
invite messages. 
8 8 7 7 7 37 High risk 
The attacker congest  the up-
link with ICMP flood 
9 9 9 9 9 45 High risk 
The attacker congests the up-
link with UDP flood 
9 9 9 9 9 45 High risk 
Crashing Cisco routers with an 
unexpected header (DOS at-
tack). 
9 9 9 9 9 45 High risk 
Crashing an end system by 
ping of death attack (Sending 
oversized ping request packets 
which violates the Internet Pro-
tocol). 
5 6 7 3 3 24 Medium risk 
Crashing a firewall with unex-
pected header (DOS attack). 
9 8 8 0 8 33 Medium risk 
Overflowing the IPS/Firewall 
entry table with bogus packets. 
9 8 8 0 8 33 Medium risk 
 
 
                                                  
Table 2 Threat Prioritization based on DREAD 
D: damage potential    E: exploitability   D: discoverability    R: reproducibility    A: affected users 
 
All threats that classified as high risk should receive extra control by building for each of them a robust 
mitigation process as well as an incident response plan. Alternatively, we can employ the following formula 
to perform threat risk assessment: 
 
                                Risk= Threat * Vulnerability * Consequence 
     
        
Attack tree is considered one of the most effective approaches for listing all opportunities available to perpe-
trators in order to achieve their objectives, and it can be done by thinking From the adversary’s perspective on 
how to degrade the performance of a cloud infrastructure, or if it’s possible crashing down available resources. 
We have built a DDoS attack tree to give a clear picture on different opportunities available to perpetrators, and 
it is not complete because every cloud infrastructure has its own design, equipment, services, security policies and 
network throughput. This should be done similar to the diagram shown in Figure 5. 
 
4.2 Building Attack Tree and Mitigation Process 
DDoS attacks are most common type of security attacks which has been frequently seen in recent years as 
discussed earlier. DDoS attacks can disable a complete feature and make resources inaccessible. DDoS attack is 
the biggest threat to cloud computing and for its success. Therefore, it is the key part of our approach to demon-
strate systematic approach to security requirements can prevent DDoS influencing through design and develop-
ment. Our approach is to use Microsoft threat modelling tool to build attack tree and use misuse cases to identify 
security requirements. We also propose to use business process, network, and cloud simulation tools to completely 
study and evaluate the proposed design. After building a data flow diagram; we can use the results provided by 
the attack tree to determine which countermeasures should be employed to consider each attack, and each coun-
termeasure should be characterized by a status. DDoS state of art has complicated the task for security providers 
to build a comprehensive protection that can detect and discard DDoS traffic in real time without alteration with 
legitimate traffic. However, the following formula is developed to give insight about the best approach that can 
defeat completely this threat, and also it will direct cloud providers as well as enterprises to be ready for the attack 
before taking place. Therefore, we can define DDoS protection process as: 
                  
Security requirements with DDoS Protection= Contingency plan +DDoS security best practices + use 
misuse cases 
 
When a DDoS attack is being detected by monitoring tools; the cloud provider should have an incident response 
(IR) plan, which details the processes that should be followed during mitigation. IR plan comprises: incident 
documentation, containment strategies, incident escalation and incident recovery. Some examples of incident re-
sponse procedures are detailed below: 
- Use specialised devices to stop the attack near the network cloud. 
- Using black holing to direct DDoS traffic to a null port. 
- Switching to alternate networks. 
- Unwanted connections on routers should be terminated. 
- Contacting the internal team for attack visibility (Security staff + Network operation). 
- Relieving the pressure on infrastructure using upstream filtering.  
Deshmukha and Devadkarb (2015) discuss that the main intention of a DDoS attack is to make the victim 
unable to use the resources. In most of the scenarios, targets could be web servers, CPU, Storage, and the other 
Network resources. In cloud environment also DDoS can reduce the performance of cloud services significantly 
by damaging the virtual servers. 
5 Integrated Security Software Development Lifecycle Process 
The above discussed drawbacks and requirements for a concise method, lead us to develop a model that integrates 
various activities of identifying and analysing software security engineering into the software development pro-
cess, and this new process and its activities is shown in Figure 6. However, this paper focuses on only software 
security requirements specific activities. According to this model, SSRE (software security requirements engi-
neering) consists of identifying standards and strategies of the organisation with regards to requirements elicitation 
(including analysis, validation, verification), conducting risk management and mitigation, and identifying soft-
ware security requirements consists of a further sub-processes of defining security, identifying security strategies, 
conducting areas and domain scope analysis, business process modeling and simulation, identifying security is-
sues, applying use cases and misuse cases, attack patterns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Integrated secure software development engineering life cycle (IS-SDLC) 
Likewise, this model also provides security-specific processes for identifying security threats during design, de-
velopment, testing, deployment, and maintenance. There are a numerous number of good design principles that 
can be found in a vast majority of software design literatures. However, the following is a list of some of the key 
design principles that are highly relevant to software security design and are part of our IS-SDLC model: 
 
 Principles of least privilege states to allow only a minimal set of rights (privileges) to a subject that requests 
access to a resource. This helps to avoid intentional or intentional damage that can be caused to a resource in 
case of an attack. 
 Principles of separation of privilege states that a system should not allow access to resources based on a single 
condition rather it should be based on multiple conditions which has to be abstracted into independent compo-
nents. 
 Design by incorporating known CVE 
 Design for resilience for which we have team up with IBM to develop a resilience model which supports system 
sustainability along side with Building Trust and Security In (BTSI) 
 Select software security requirements after performance simulation using BPMN (Business Process Modeling 
Notation) and is described in detail by Ramachandran (2014; Chang and Ramachandran 2016). 
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SSRE activities in our IS-SDLC supports security in software defined networking (SDN), Cloud computing ser-
vices (Software as a service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Enterprise 
security includes cloud service providers and service consumers, and design for security principles and techniques. 
This is one of our unique contributions to the body of knowledge in software security research. 
6 Software Security Requirements Engineering Method as part of IS-SDLC 
Secure software engineering has taken up widespread understanding of the importance of integrating security 
across development life-cycle phases. Ouselati et. al (2016) discusses the challenges of secure software develop-
ment using Agile based approach. Similarly, during requirements engineering activities, existing methods discuss 
lots on requirements change and do not consider integrating security as part of requirements evolution. Mead, 
Morales and Alice (2015) have proposed to enhance current SDLC with misuse cases derived from malware 
analysis based on attacks. Beckers et al (2014) have proposed a structured, pattern-based method supporting elic-
iting security requirements and selecting security measures and their method guides potential cloud customers to 
model the application of their business case in a cloud computing context using a pattern-based approach, also 
known as Cloud System Analysis Pattern. However, these approaches are very interesting but lacks integrating 
security requirements from various stakeholders. This paper aims to fulfil that gap by integrating various stake-
holders and they often provide differing software security requirements which needs to be consolidate by require-
ments engineers. Software development and secure software development involve many stakeholders and busi-
ness leaders and their coordination is critical for delivering secure software systems. The various stakeholders is 
shown in the Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7. Stakeholders in Integrated Secure-SDLC (IS-SDLC) 
The previous section has provided a brief account of various methodologies for eliciting requirements for soft-
ware security. Most common best practices are: 
 
1. Eliciting and extracting requirements for software security explicitly with visual notations 
2. Prioritising software security requirements 
3. Risk assessment and mitigation for software security requirements 
4. Design and implement software security requirements 
5. Providing SDLC life-cycle support 
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Existing methods lack heavily on incorporating social engineering to study software security requirements 
(learning From real experiences), security-specific business process modeling, performance simulations of the 
security-specific business processes, service computing, current and emerging technologies such as cloud com-
puting, software-defined networking architecture, and software-defined enterprise security, and emerging vulner-
abilities, and cyber attacks. This leads us to develop an integrated-secure software development model supporting 
software security requirements to be assessed and implemented explicitly in our method as presented in this paper. 
Ramachandran (2012) provides a comparative analysis of various software security requirements engineering 
(SSRE), design, and test methods based on our evaluation criteria used and this will help organization and engi-
neers to choose appropriate method that is suitable for the system being developed. Based on the experience with 
IS-SDLC model in various projects, this paper has identified a set of best practice guidelines and recommendations 
on SSRE and SSE in general. 
As part of the IS-SDLC, this paper have developed a development process model for cloud services with BSI 
(Build Security-In) across the cloud service development lifecycle. It is also well known best practice to eliciting 
and validating service level requirements early can save cost as much as 70% of the overall test and development 
costs. As shown in the diagram, the cloud development process model consists of a number of phases such as RE 
for cloud, conducting BPM modelling and specification (using BPMN 2 standard and BPEL), identifying and 
specifying SLAs, building software security in, designing services, and test and deploy. This is shown in Figure 
8. 
 
 
Figure 8 IS-SDLC’s Cloud services development process 
The RE phase consists of a number of parallel sequences such as clear identification of service requirements 
along with security requirements, and conduct/develop BPMN (business process modelling notation) for each 
service scenario which will also allow us to simulate and study their performance effectiveness before actual 
design and implementation begins. This is new for the traditional requirements engineering process. The next step 
in our IS-SDLC model proposes to identify clear SLAs (service level contract and governance for each cloud 
service. The following step is to develop a design for cloud security utilizing all well known design principles and 
to design services using SoaML or service component models using UML 2. We could also apply classical SDLC 
models such as waterfall, spiral, and others to capture functional and non-functional features for each SaaS ser-
vices and web services. For example, to develop eHealth cloud services, IS-SDLC recommends classical formal 
specification methods. During the design stage, we could employ a set of good design rationales to compose SaaS 
as components. During business process modelling and service level specification, we can use BPMN for model-
ling and BPEL to specify service level workflows. These artifacts can then easily be transformed into a set of 
SaaS services. The model shown in this section is a security driven cloud development process. Hence, the main 
reason for identifying, specifying, and designing service level software security specific issues have been ad-
dressed across all phases of the development process. 
7 Best Practice Guidelines  
For secured systems, this paper identifies a set of common guidelines that are applicable to most of the secure 
software development: 
1. Develop a list of security requirements checklists and classify them as: critical, medium, and moderate. 
2. Bring in a requirements inspection team to conduct the security requirements validation process 
3. Identify, elicit, analyse, and manage security requirements 
4. Specify and model misuse cases and derive security requirements frorroomm misuse cases 
5. Cross-check operational and functional requirements against security requirements 
6. Establish an organisational security culture (e.g, check to make sure proper use of email systems do’s and 
don’ts). 
7. Apply DREAD model and Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle for identifying threat and mitigation 
8. Apply business process Modelling and simulation using BPMN tools such as Bonita soft which provides clear 
performance attributed for all selected security-specific processes. 
9. Develop design for cloud security 
10. Design cloud services with SoaML or UML 2.0 Component model 
11. Apply network simulation tools to study and identify network threats 
 
8 Conclusion 
Software security engineering offers several best practices, techniques, and methods to develop systems and 
services that are built for security, resiliency, sustainability. However, software security can not be just added 
after a system has been built and delivered to customers as seen in today’s software applications. This paper 
provided concise techniques and best practice requirements guidelines on software security and also discussed an 
Integrated-Secure SDLC model (IS-SDLC), which will benefit practitioners, researchers, learners, and educators. 
This paper has demonstrated the application of Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle and has developed an 
integrated secure software development process model for cloud computing. 
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